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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.1 
 
Doctors make mistakes—preventable medical mistakes—that kill or seriously 
injure patients.2  The best way to reduce these preventable errors is through a medical 
peer review process typically referred to as a “morbidity and mortality conference.”3  
                                                          
*Alan G. Williams, Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. 
 1 Paraphrasing Aristotle, Jeremy Bentham, and John 11:49-50. 
 2 The medical errors physicians commit are, of course, unintentional.  This essay is 
intended neither as a criticism of physicians nor of the medical care they render. 
 3 Because morbidity and mortality conferences are historically confidential, few non-
physicians ever attend.  For readers unfamiliar with them, the following two links provide 
fictionalized dramatizations of what morbidity and mortality conferences are, how they are 
conducted, what is discussed, and what the remedial and corrective effects can be: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kT4KN0kG--A and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
MaiXSzZGr9Y.  Regarding M&Ms as the best means to reduce medical errors, see infra Part II 
Section B. 
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However, over the past twenty years, federal and state courts, state legislatures, and 
state voters have effectively gutted the morbidity and mortality conference (“M&M”) 
as a remedial and preventative tool, resulting in tens of thousands of unnecessary 
deaths every year.4  Doctors need our help restoring the effectiveness of M&Ms.  
Congress has created the means to do so;5 now, all the courts need do is use it.  
Otherwise, what has been happening over the last two decades will continue—
physicians will fear the M&M, will either not participate in M&Ms or not participate 
fully, medical errors will not be thoroughly investigated and corrected, and the same 
preventable medical mistakes will continue to occur because physicians are scared if 
they admit during an M&M that they committed an error then, in a subsequent medical 
malpractice lawsuit, their admission will be used against them to prove negligence and 
liability.6  Doctors aren’t stupid—if we continue to punish them when they admit their 
mistakes then they’ll simply stop admitting them . . . which is bad for everyone, 
especially patients. 
For nearly half a century the law recognized—either via case law or statute—a 
peer review privilege designed to immunize physicians and physician peer review 
committees, including M&Ms, from liability, and protect certain peer review 
statements, information, and materials from admissibility or disclosure in any 
subsequent legal proceedings.7  Then, beginning in the mid-1990s, decisions in both 
federal and state courts, along with statutes enacted by some state legislatures—and 
                                                          
 4 See infra Part I. 
 5 See PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT infra Part Error! Reference 
source not found.. 
 6 See, e.g., Duncan MacCourt & Joseph Bernstein, Medical Error Reduction and Tort 
Reform Through Private, Contractually-Based Quality Medicine Societies, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 
505, 552 (2009) (“Physicians are scared that identification and remediation of medical error—
whether of their own or of their colleagues’—will expose them to a lawsuit.”); Kathryn Leaman, 
Let’s Give Them Something to Talk About: How the PSQIA May Provide Federal Privilege and 
Confidentiality Protections to the Medical Peer Review Process,  11 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 
177, 178 (2007) (“Over the years, physicians became more and more reluctant to participate in 
the peer review process because of their increased risk of civil liability as the committees’ focus 
shifted from the possible negligent care provided by the hospital to the possible negligent care 
each individual physician provided, thus undercutting the ultimate goal of improving the quality 
of healthcare.”). 
 7 The peer review privilege was, at least implicitly, first legally recognized in Bredice v. 
Doctors Hospital, 50 F.R.D. 249 (1970), aff’d 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in which the court 
held that all communications during and records of a “staff meeting” conducted pursuant to 
guidelines promulgated by the Joint Commissions on Accreditation of Hospitals whose purpose 
was to review the medical care resulting in the patient’s death were “entitled to a qualified 
privilege on the basis of [the] overwhelming public interest” in identifying medical errors so 
they can be prevented in the future.  The court employed the “self-critical analysis” privilege in 
so ruling.  Other jurisdictions created a peer review privilege based in part on the rationale 
behind the inadmissibility of subsequent remedial measures to prove liability (Federal Rule of 
Evidence 407).  See, e.g., Fox v. Kramer, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513 (Cal. App. 1999), judgment 
affirmed, 22 Cal. 4th 531 (Cal. App. 2000).  
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even voter-initiated state constitutional changes—began to erode the peer review 
privilege.8 
Consider, six-year-old Hannah arrives with her parents at the children’s hospital 
for a scheduled tonsillectomy.  Hannah’s parents are worried but surgeon Dr. Gwande 
reassures them the procedure is routine and then introduces Hannah to the 
anesthesiologist, Dr. Stevens.  Hannah gets prepped for surgery, is administered 
anesthesia by Dr. Stevens, and counts backward from one hundred until she becomes 
unconscious.  Dr. Gwande successfully and without incident removes Hannah’s 
tonsils, but Hannah never wakes up from the procedure. 
Hannah’s parents are devastated; they want answers regarding why their daughter 
died and assurances nothing like this will ever happen to someone else’s child.  The 
hospital summons Dr. Stevens and Dr. Gwande for a peer review morbidity and 
mortality conference to investigate what went wrong and how the hospital can ensure 
the mistake is not repeated.9  During the M&M,10 the two physicians candidly explain 
that they have investigated and identified the medical error that led to Hannah’s death: 
the anesthesia dosage was mixed incorrectly, resulting in Hannah being administered 
100 times the recommended amount.  Unaware of the glitch in its procedures until this 
incident and subsequent investigative M&M, the hospital implements a new policy to 
ensure this type mistake never happens again. 
A year later, Hannah’s parents sue the hospital and the two physicians, alleging 
medical negligence in the death of their daughter, and during the discovery phase of 
the lawsuit demand all the information, documentation, and statements/admissions 
made by Drs. Stevens and Gwande, including everything done and said at the M&M.  
The defendants object, claiming the protections of the peer review privilege and 
arguing that if M&Ms are not privileged, confidential, and inadmissible in any 
subsequent legal proceedings, physicians have no incentive to admit and discuss 
mistakes in an effort to prevent future similar errors.11  Depending upon what 
                                                          
 8 Based on Supreme Court and circuit court of appeals precedent, nearly all federal districts 
courts have likewise declined to recognize a federal privilege for peer review.  See infra Part III 
Section Error! Reference source not found. and note 81.  For evidence of state courts eroding 
the peer review privilege see infra note 87.  Some state legislatures have also limited the peer 
review privilege with in their state.  See infra note 90. 
 9 Such a peer review meeting “has the goal of protecting future patients from medical 
error.”  Frederick Levy et al., The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 31 J. 
LEGAL MED. 399, 401 (2010). 
 10 Some hospitals, medical institutions, and state statutes do not employ the term “morbidity 
and mortality conference.”  In this essay, however, “morbidity and mortality conference” or 
“M&M” refers to any peer review meeting at which an adverse medical outcome in a specific 
patient or class of patients is discussed, reviewed, investigated, or analyzed by participating 
physicians.  
 11 Physicians “who engage in this self-scrutiny will have to generate highly sensitive data 
about their own performance, data that may reveal” negligent medical care.  Alice G. Gosfield, 
“Patient Safety Organization Can Help Providers Improve Performance and Results,” MEDICAL 
ECONOMICS (Jan. 23, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-
economics/content/tags/data-collection/patient-safety-organizations-can-help-providers-
impro?page=0,0.  
 
 
224 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 229:221 
 
jurisdiction Drs. Gwande and Stevens practice in, the M&M is either privileged and 
protected from admissibility or it is not. 
The law recognizes numerous evidentiary privileges, and values some privileges 
more than others: the attorney-client communication privilege is considered more 
sacred than the attorney work-product privilege, the spousal communications privilege 
more important than the spousal testimonial privilege.12  Unfortunately, even where it 
still exists, the peer review privilege is way down on the list.  Although other privileges 
certainly must be valued for what they protect, how can shielding what a client 
communicates to his attorney be more important or deserve greater legal protection 
than saving tens of thousands of lives every year?  If Congress and state legislatures—
which accept the premise that M&Ms result in improved medical care, fewer medical 
errors, and a reduction of preventable injuries and deaths—believe the peer review 
privilege affords physicians the best opportunity to maximize the benefits of M&Ms, 
shouldn’t we value the peer review privilege at least as much as we value other 
evidentiary privileges?  Shouldn’t the peer review privilege—at a minimum—trump 
an individual medical malpractice plaintiff’s attempt for monetary recovery?  
Weighing the needs of the many against the needs of the few, isn’t saving tens of 
thousands of lives annually more important than a handful of medical malpractice 
plaintiffs improving their odds of being monetarily compensated?  In this essay, I 
argue that it is. 
By enacting the relatively obscure Patient Safety Improvement and Quality Care 
Act13 in 2005 (which did not truly take effect until 200914), Congress provided a tool 
that can be employed to resuscitate the peer review privilege, although no court has 
yet invoked the PSQIA and upheld the privilege.15  In this essay, I argue that courts 
must employ the PSQIA and begin upholding the peer review privilege to protect 
M&Ms, which will ultimately result in an improved quality of medical care rendered, 
a reduction of medical errors, and fewer patient deaths. 
Part I of this essay summarizes the extent of the problem—many call it a crisis—
of preventable deaths plaguing U.S. hospitals.  Part II explains peer review, both in 
the context of physician credentialing/hiring and M&Ms, and the legal protections 
afforded under the provisions of immunity, confidentiality, and privilege.  Part III 
discusses how federal and state court decisions, state legislative enactments, and voter 
initiatives have weakened existing protections for peer review, especially regarding 
M&Ms.  Part IV describes the PSQIA and how it can—and should—be the solution 
to preventable hospital deaths.  Part V concludes with a summation of the argument 
that courts employ the PSQIA privilege to protect M&Ms, and that physicians and 
hospitals do their part by fulfilling the requirements of the PSQIA such that they may 
invoke the privilege therein contained.  
 
                                                          
 12 Steven Walker, The Attorney Client Privilege and Work Product - Navigating Recent 
Changes and How They Affect Your Technology Company, https://apps.americanbar.org/
litigation/committees/intellectual/roundtables/0308_outline.pdf. 
 13 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21 to -26 (2006). 
 14 The Department of Health and Human Services did not issue final regulations until 
December of 2008 allowing for the creation of Patient Safety Organizations. 
 15 See infra note 115. 
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II. PREVENTABLE HOSPITAL DEATHS 
 
Few truly understood the extent and severity of the national crisis of preventable 
hospital deaths until publication of the 1999 Institute of Medicine’s comprehensive 
report estimating that as many as 98,000 patients die each year in America’s hospitals 
from preventable medical errors,16 a mortality figure three times as high as the number 
of annual deaths caused by vehicular accidents.17  Fourteen years later, a separate study 
concluded that more than 400,000 preventable deaths occur nationally each year as a 
result of medical errors.18 Other studies have concluded that nearly half of all patients 
experience a medical error at some point during treatment,19 as many as 18% of 
hospital patients endure a medical injury caused by a healthcare provider,20 and “some 
medical errors are not known by clinicians and only come to light during autopsies, 
which have found misdiagnoses in 20% to 40% of cases.”21 
A medical error is defined as “the failure of a planned action to be completed as 
intended (i.e., error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e., 
error of planning).”22  All medical errors do not result in harm or death, and all 
preventable medical injuries/deaths are not necessarily caused by medical errors.  As 
of 2009, Medicare and Medicaid no longer reimburse healthcare providers for care 
                                                          
 16 Institute of Medicine, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (Kohn 
et al. eds., 2000).  See, also, Carol Brass, A Proposed Evidentiary Privilege for Medical 
Checklists, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 835, 851 (2010) (“One commentator described medical 
errors as the ‘eighth leading cause of death in the United States.  The number of deaths [every 
day] due to errors is equivalent to a jet airliner crashing every day.’”), quoting, David Costa, 
Human Error: An Inevitable Part of Healthcare, or a Better Future?, RESPIRATORY THERAPY, 
JUNE-JULY 2008, at 9.  
 17 Tom Baker, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH  22, 23 (2005).  Preventable medical 
errors were approximated to cost between $17 billion and $29 billion each year, when factoring 
in direct healthcare costs, disability, lost productivity, and lost wages/income.  See IOM, TO 
ERR IS HUMAN, supra note16, at 1-3.  Empirical research suggests that medical errors committed 
in hospitals add approximately $1,264 in costs per patient admission.  Michelle M. Mello et al., 
Who Pays for Medical Errors?  An Analysis of Adverse Event Costs, the Medical Liability 
System, and Incentives for Patient Safety Improvement, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 838, 847 
(2007). 
 18 John T. James, A New, Evidence-based Estimate of Patient Harms Associated with 
Hospital Care, 9 J. PATIENT SAFETY 122 (2013).  If the 400,000 figure is accurate, only cancer 
and heart disease kill more Americans annually than preventable medical harm/errors.  Leah 
Binder, “Stunning News on Preventable Deaths in Hospitals,” Forbes (September 23, 2013), 
accessed at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/leahbinder/2013/09/23/stunning-news-on-
preventable-deaths-in-hospitals/.   
 19 Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications for Malpractice Law and 
Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 370 (2005). 
 20 Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost of Choice, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 957, 971 (2010) (“Studies have found that between four and eighteen percent 
of hospital patients are the victims of medical errors, many of which cause serious injuries.”). 
 21 See James, Evidence-based Estimate, supra note 18 at 122, citing, Lucian Leape, Institute 
of Medicine Medical Error Figures Are Not Exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95 (2000). 
 22 See IOM, TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 16 at 28. 
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rendered to rectify a “never event”;23 however, most preventable medical injuries 
would not be categorized as never events (which, thankfully, are quite rare24).  
Regardless, preventable medical injuries and deaths—whether caused by medical 
error or not—continue to occur far too frequently in U.S. hospitals.  Therefore, 
corrective measures must be undertaken to address preventable hospital deaths.  Most 
physicians agree that peer review and, more specifically, effective morbidity and 
mortality conferences, present the best means to reduce preventable hospital deaths.25 
For example, on March 29, 2012, twelve-year-old Rory Staunton was discharged 
from the emergency room with a diagnosis of dehydration and nausea subsequent to a 
two-day-old cut on his arm.26  Rory’s pediatrician had sent him to the ER because 
Rory was complaining of pain and had vomited on the pediatrician.  The ER 
physicians ordered lab tests, supplied Rory with I.V. fluids, determined Rory had 
improved, and sent him home.  The lab tests, however, revealed Rory was producing 
neutrophils and bands (white blood cells) at abnormally high rates, suggesting a 
serious bacterial infection.  Three days later, Rory was dead from streptococcus 
pyogenes, a normally-occurring bacteria that can turn deadly if it moves from the 
throat to penetrate blood or soft tissue.  The ER physicians’ failure to properly interpret 
the lab results, appreciate that Rory exhibited three symptoms of possible sepsis, and 
discharge of Rory with an incorrect diagnosis is a prime example of a preventable 
medical error resulting in death.  This is the exact type of iatrogenic mistake the 
Institute of Medicine’s report explained could be remedied by performing systems-
based evaluations of medical care.  Instead of blaming an individual physician, the 
IOM report sought to engender a revolutionary approach to medical errors that focused 
on correcting systemic defects.27  A system that somehow alerted Rory’s ER 
physicians to check for streptococcus pyogenes based on a combination of the lab 
results and the exhibition of three sepsis indicators may have saved Rory’s life.28 
                                                          
 23 For a list of the 28 “never events” listed by Medicare/Medicaid, please see, U.S. Dept. 
Health and Human Services letter to state Medicare/Medicaid directors 7/31/08, 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-Guidance/downloads/SMD073108.pdf (last accessed 
September 16, 2014).  
 24 Id.  Although rare, studies show that when they do occur, “never events” are fatal in 71% 
of cases. 
 25 See, e.g., Steven J. Kravet, et al., Morbidity and Mortality Conference, Grand Rounds, 
and the ACGME’s Core Competencies, 21 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 1192 (2006); George E. 
Newton II, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the Social and Judicial Costs of Medical Peer 
Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723, 724 (2001). 
 26 This incident was detailed in, “An Infection, Unnoticed, Turns Unstoppable,” NEW YORK 
TIMES, July 11, 2012 at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/nyregion/in-rory-stauntons-fight-
for-his-life-signs-that-went-unheeded.html? pagewanted=all (last accessed September 30, 
2014).  
 27 Because they are specialized, highly-complex, and operate interdependently, hospitals 
and healthcare systems are particularly vulnerable to systemic error.  See IOM, TO ERR IS 
HUMAN, supra note 16 at 58-59. 
 28 See, e.g., Levy, Patient Safety, supra note 9 at 400: 
[A] systems-based approach prospectively seeks to correct and improve systemic 
sources of error.  Through this approach, patient safety standards could constantly be 
evaluated, revised, and improved to maximize patient safety . . . [S]uch a systems-based 
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III. PEER REVIEW 
 
The term “peer review” generally describes an array of review processes created 
by hospitals, medical groups, and other healthcare entities to verify that only 
competent physicians treat patients and that they continue to provide quality medical 
care.29  The medical community created peer review “to decrease instances of medical 
malpractice and improve the condition of health care by allowing practicing 
physicians to recognize inadequacies in their peers’ performances and discipline 
accordingly.”30  Initiated in the early 1900s,31 hospitals began formalizing the peer 
review process in 1952 after the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals 
began requiring hospitals create peer review procedures in order to obtain 
accreditation.32  For a hospital to participate in and receive reimbursement from 
Medicare or Medicaid it must establish a peer review committee, and most states 
include in their hospital licensure requirements the creation and maintenance of a peer 
review committee.33  There are two distinct subsets within the concept of peer review: 
hospital credentialing/admitting privileges and M&Ms.34 
 
                                                          
approach would focus on prospective systemic safety remedies and prophylaxis, rather 
than on retrospective assessment of blame.  The focus of a systems-based review of 
error would be to assess potential flaws so as to prevent future errors. 
 29 Ilene N. Moore, Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical Malpractice 
Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2006).  See also, Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical 
Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit—Is It Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 12 
(1999) (“peer review is the generally accepted method of enhancing quality health care”); 
Daniel M. Mulholland III and Phil Zarone, Waiver of the Peer Review Privilege: A Survey of 
the Law, 49 S.D. L. REV. 424 (2004) (the “peer review system is the only meaningful, ongoing 
process by which medical care is monitored and evaluated and inferior care is dealt with through 
sanctions that prevent substandard practitioners from causing harm to patients”). 
 30 See Newton, Maintaining the Balance, supra note 25 at 724. 
 31 In 1914, Dr. Ernest Codman at Massachusetts General Hospital attempted to create “End 
Results Cards” regarding patient diagnosis, treatment, and outcome, as well as to conduct 
conferences to evaluate physicians’ competence; Mass. General considered Dr. Codman 
disruptive to the status quo and he was fired.  Ultimately, Dr. Codman’s “efforts were not in 
vain, however, as the wheels of progress had been set in motion.  Dr. Codman’s ideas 
contributed to the standardization of hospital practices—including a case report system that 
ascribed responsibility for outcomes—by the American College of Surgeons in 1916.”  THE 
SAGES MANUAL OF QUALITY, OUTCOMES AND PATIENT SAFETY: Chapter 18. Morbidity and 
Mortality by Chirag A. Dholakia and Kevin M. Reavis 162-164 (Tichansky, Morton, and Jones, 
eds. 2012). 
 32 See Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review, supra note 29 at 13. 
 33 Eleanor D. Kinney, Hospital Peer Review of Physicians: Does Statutory Immunity 
Increase Risk of Unwarranted Professional Injury?, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 57, 60 (2009).  
Similarly, Congress further recognized the benefits of a protected peer review process when it 
created such for both the Department of Defense and Department of Veteran Affairs medical 
programs.  See, 10 U.S.C.A. §1102(a) (West 2012) and 38 U.S.C.A. §5705(a) (West 2012). 
 34 Id.  
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A. Credentialing and Admitting “Privileges”35 
 
Prior to granting hospital admitting privileges to physicians to allow them to treat 
patients at its hospital or prior to hiring physicians as hospital employees, a panel of 
physicians at the hospital undertakes a review of the education, training, experience, 
and medical outcomes of the reviewed physician; this process falls under the general 
umbrella of peer review.36  So vital to ensuring that hospitals only employ—or grant 
treatment/admitting privileges to—competent physicians, in 1986 Congress enacted 
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act37 (“HCQIA”) in part to promote quality 
peer review.38  The HCQIA sets forth the standards for peer reviews but does not itself 
provide any legal protections—other than qualified immunity from suit, under certain 
circumstances—for those reviewing physicians participating in the peer review 
process.39  The HCQIA established no legal protections for the reviewed physician 
and specifically rejected creating a federal evidentiary privilege to protect peer 
review.40  Relying on Congress’ failure to create a federal peer review privilege in the 
HCQIA and themselves declining to find a peer review privilege within federal 
common law,41 federal courts have repeatedly held there is no federal peer review 
                                                          
 35 The term hospital admitting “privileges” simply means that a physician who is not an 
employee of, or independent contractor for, a hospital nonetheless may admit to, and treat 
patients at, a particular hospital.  I apologize for any confusion caused the reader, but in the 
legal context “privileges” means one thing but in the medical context it means something else 
entirely. 
 36 Lisa M. Nijm, Pitfalls of Peer Review, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541, 543 (2003). 
 37 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152. 
 38 The second reason Congress enacted the HCQIA was to create the National Practitioner 
Data Bank, “a national clearinghouse of information, to prevent physicians who had their 
clinical privileges at a hospital limited due to quality problems from moving to other hospitals 
with impunity.”  See Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review, supra note 29 at 8, 
https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I5d495061227711dbbab99dfb880c57ae/View/
FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=%28sc.Default%29&
userEnteredCitation=25+Am.+J.L.+%26+Med.+7 - co_footnote_F20110783765.   
 39 Congress well-knew that physicians would be hesitant to serve as peer reviewers if they 
thought they could be sued personally for denying another physician admitting privileges at the 
hospital, rejecting a physician from employment at the hospital, or firing a physician from the 
hospital.  
 40 “Even with immunity for participating in peer review proceedings, [physicians] may still 
be reluctant to participate in the peer review process because they do not want their appraisals 
of a physician's competence to be disclosed later in court . . . during a malpractice or other action 
later brought against the reviewed physician.”  See Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review, 
supra note 29 at 18.  
 41 Although the Supreme Court expressly held that “Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence authorizes federal courts to define new privileges by interpreting ‘common law 
principles . . . in the light of reason and experience,’”  Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 1927 
(1996), nearly all federal courts have declined to do so regarding a peer review privilege. 
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privilege protecting the statements made during, the information elicited within, or the 
documents generated by the peer review process.42 
In the absence of a federal peer review privilege but recognizing that “[p]eer 
review confidentiality is rooted in public policy to support physicians in their self-
regulatory efforts to monitor the competency and conduct of their peers,”43 each of the 
50 states and the District of Columbia enacted a statute or evidentiary rule to legally 
protect as privileged the peer review process.44  However, over the last two decades, 
state court decisions45 and state legislative enactments46 have resulted in states’ 
statutory privileges either disappearing or being severely restricted in the protections 
provided, leaving physicians without an effective peer review privilege in either 
federal or state courts. 
 
B. The Morbidity and Mortality Conference47 
 
                                                          
 42 See, e.g., Allen v. Cuyahoga Co., 2014 WL 434558 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (“The weight of 
authority in the Sixth Circuit and elsewhere is that no medical peer review privilege exists under 
federal common law”); Charles G. Kels, Odd Man Out? The Medical Peer Review Privilege in 
Federal Litigation, 60-DEC FED. LAW. 52, 54 (2013) (“[p]eer review materials may be 
discoverable in connection with many federal causes of action”). 
 43 Kenneth R. Kohlberg, The Medical Peer Review Privilege: A Linchpin for Patient Safety 
Measures, 86 MASS. L. REV. 157, 157-158 (2002).  See also, DeFrancesco v. Stamford Health, 
2013 WL 1189380 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 2013) (The “strong policy favoring free and open discussion 
in peer review proceedings represents a legislative choice between medical staff candor and a 
plaintiff's access to information.”). 
 44 Am. Med. Ass'n, PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: A 50 STATE SURVEY AND 
ANALYSIS 4 (2006); see also, THE NEW WIGMORE § 7.8.2, at 1124; Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 
1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[w]e are mindful of the fact that a peer review privilege is 
recognized by all fifty states and the District of Columbia”).  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§36-445.01 (WEST 2012) (“All proceedings, records and materials prepared in connection with 
[peer] reviews . . . including all peer reviews of individual health care providers practicing in 
and applying to practice in hospitals or outpatient surgical centers and the records of such 
reviews, are confidential and are not subject to discovery.”); CAL EVID. CODE §1157(A) (WEST 
2012) (“Neither the proceedings nor the records of organized . . . peer review bod[ies], or 
medical or dental review [bodies] . . . shall be subject to discovery.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. §19A-
17B(D) (WEST 2012) (“The proceedings of a medical review committee conducting a peer 
review shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action for or 
against a health care provider arising out of the matters which are subject to evaluation and 
review by such committee”); IND. CODE §34-30-15-2 (WEST 2012) (“[A] person who attends a 
peer review committee proceeding shall not be permitted or required to disclose:(1) any 
information acquired in connection with or in the course of a proceeding; (2) any opinion, 
recommendation, or evaluation of the committee; or (3) any opinion, recommendation, or 
evaluation of any committee member.”). 
 45 See infra Part III, Section B. 
 46 See infra part III, Section C.  
  
 47 Some states specifically employ the term “morbidity and mortality conference” or 
“morbidity and mortality committee” while others use a hybrid of the term.  For example, 
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Separate from a physician’s credentialing and the granting of hospital admitting 
privileges, there exists a second subset of peer review designed to allow physicians to 
discuss in an open yet protected forum medical mistakes resulting in injury or death.48  
Whether a resident physician at an academic medical center or an attending physician 
with thirty years’ experience, either may be summoned before a morbidity and 
mortality conference.49  The M&M traces its roots to the origination of the peer review 
process itself, but only in 1983 did the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education begin requiring all resident physician training programs to create and 
conduct regular M&Ms.50 
During an M&M, “the errors made and resultant complications during the care of 
patients are scrutinized and discussed” by physicians with the goals being “to modify 
behavior and judgment based on previous experiences, and to prevent repetition of 
errors leading to further complications.”51  Many institutions conduct M&Ms monthly, 
                                                          
Maryland calls it a “Morbidity and Quality Review Committee.”  MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH GEN. 
§ 5-802(B). 
 48 In general, the five goals of an M&M are: (1) identify events resulting in adverse medical 
outcomes; (2) encourage discussion of adverse events; (3) identify and disseminate information 
and insights regarding patient care drawn from physicians’ experiences; (4) reinforce 
accountability for providing high-quality patient care; and, (5) create a forum in which 
physicians acknowledge and address reasons for medical mistakes with the goal of 
reducing/eliminating similar errors.  Jay D. Orlander, MD, MPH, Thomas W. Barber, MD, and 
Graeme Fincke, MD, The Morbidity and Mortality Conference: The Delicate Nature of 
Learning from Error, 77 ACAD. MED. 1001, 1004 (2002). 
 49 One study found that, of responding medical institutions, 90% conducted regular 
M&Ms—usually on a monthly basis—and that physician attendance was mandatory.  The study 
concluded that M&Ms bring “doctors together to examine cases that have gone badly in an 
effort to increase their skill” and “learning from mistakes and confronting error are central to 
the medical profession and form the basis” of the belief in the importance of M&Ms.  Id. at 
1005. 
 50 ACGME Program Requirements for Graduate Medical Education in Surgery: 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education; 2014, available at 
https://www.acgme.org/acgmeweb/Portals/0/PFAssets/ProgramRequirements/ 440_general_
surgery_07012014.pdf  (last accessed September 19, 2014).  The ACGME is the governing 
body for all medical residency programs in the United States.  No physician may be licensed 
without undergoing training in a residency program, no matter where that physician attended 
medical school.  Therefore, all residents are subject to the requirement of attending regular 
M&Ms, at least while they are in their residency training program.  Depending where a fully 
licensed physician practices (e.g., an academic medical center), she may also be required to 
attend regular M&Ms, or may simply be required to attend a specific M&M where care she 
rendered is at issue. 
 51 See Dholokia, SAGES MANUAL, supra note 31 at 164.  Hospitals in other countries 
similarly conduct M&Ms with the goal of reducing preventable deaths and injuries.  See, e.g., 
Juliet Higginson, Rhiannon Walters, Naomi Fulop, Mortality and Morbidity Meetings: An 
Untapped Resource for Improving the Governance of Patient Safety?, 21 B.M.J. QUAL. SAF. 
576 (2011) (“In regularly reviewing deaths and complications, these [M&M] meetings have the 
potential to provide accountability and the necessary improvement measures required for patient 
safety as well as professional learning”) regarding M&Ms in the United Kingdom. 
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while others may have greater or less frequency;52 all institutions conduct them 
differently.  Some hospitals invite participation by physicians who desire to discuss a 
specific case, while others schedule a case for discussion at the M&M and require the 
treating physician to attend (and, usually, require that treating physician to discuss the 
care she rendered).53 
As an example of the remedial benefits of M&Ms, over a two-year period at 
Vanderbilt’s Monroe Carell, Jr. Children’s Hospital, thirty-three action items were 
identified at monthly M&Ms as corrective measures to address system-based 
deficiencies where medical errors had occurred or could occur. 54  Most of the 
deficiencies were addressed by the corrective action items, all based on what was 
learned at the M&Ms.  Although it is impossible to quantify how many patient lives 
were saved or patient injuries averted by these corrective measures, clearly the M&Ms 
and subsequent corrective actions have resulted in fewer preventable deaths and 
injuries at Vanderbilt.  For purposes of this essay, I accept that M&Ms improve patient 
care and reduce preventable medical errors, just as Congress so accepted (based on 
empirical evidence) when it passed both the HCQIA and the PSQIA.55 
Physicians firmly believe that “to provide high quality patient care, members of a 
multidisciplinary health care team must engage in objective, nonjudgmental review of 
adverse outcomes and commit systematic process change.”56  In a nutshell, that is the 
                                                          
 52 “The ACGME . . . requires that surgery morbidity and mortality conferences present and 
discuss ‘all deaths and complications that occur on a weekly basis.’”  Edgar Perluissi, MD, et. 
al., Discussion of Medical Errors in Morbidity and Mortality Conferences, 290 J. AM. MED. 
ASS. 2838 (2003).  
 53 Id.  
 54 At Vanderbilt, physicians are assured that an M&M “discussion is considered privileged 
and confidential” and the M&Ms employ a multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary root cause 
analysis that “draws on the expertise and clinical opinion of all” M&M participants to ensure 
effective peer review.  Jamie N. Deis, MD, et al., Transforming the Morbidity and Mortality 
Conference into an Instrument for Systemwide Improvement, APPROACHES IN PATIENT SAFETY: 
NEW DIRECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, VOL. 2 CULTURE AND REDESIGN (K. 
Henrikson, et al., eds. 2008). 
 55 See, e.g., infra note 106.  See also, Perluissi, Discussion of Medical Errors, supra note 52 
at 2841 (“Discussion of errors with the goal of learning how to prevent them underlies the 
tradition of the morbidity and mortality conference [citations omitted] and is supported by the 
principles of adult learning . . . Increased error reporting has led to safety improvements in other 
industries and is promoted by leaders in the fields of medicine and safety”).  However, contrast, 
Charles R. Koepke, Physician Peer Review Immunity: Time to Euthanize a Fatally Flawed 
Policy, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 1 (2009) (arguing that physicians sometimes use the protections of 
peer review to shield themselves from retaliatory actions they commit against peers: 
“Accusatory physicians who are involved in the peer review process ‘are easily able manipulate 
the process to achieve ulterior motives, such as eliminating the economic competition in a 
particular practice field’”), quoting, Yann H.H. van Geertruyden, The Fox Guarding the 
Henhouse: How the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and State Peer Review 
Protection Statutes Have Helped Protect Bad Faith Peer Review in the Medical Community, 18 
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 239, 246 (2001). 
 56 See Deis, Transforming the Morbidity, supra note 54.  See also, Orlander, Morbidity and 
Mortality Conference, supra note 48 at 1004 (“Though the M&M[ ] conference may take a 
number of different forms, one can consider its defining characteristic to be that it is designed 
to identify medical errors in order to learn from them to improve medical practice.”). 
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M&M.  Hannah died unexpectedly, and to reduce the chances of the same thing 
happening to a future patient the hospital informs Drs. Gwande and Stevens that a 
confidential meeting will occur where the cause of Hannah’s death will be investigated 
and discussed.  To inspire candor, the two physicians are assured that the M&M is 
“privileged and confidential,”57 that nothing the physicians say or do at the M&M will, 
or can, ever be used against them.58  If Dr. Stevens believes that admitting he 
committed an anesthesia mistake that cost Hannah her life could result in Hannah’s 
parents successfully introducing into evidence during their medical malpractice 
lawsuit against Dr. Stevens his implicit admission of negligence, odds are he will 
never admit to the mistake during the M&M.59  Even though he knows other 
physicians could learn from his mistake and prevent future deaths by instituting 
revised anesthesia protocols to ensure the mistake does not recur, Dr. Stevens naturally 
would be quite reluctant to expose himself and his family to severe financial loss. 
Of course, not only do physicians rightly fear whatever they admit in an M&M 
will be offered against them as an admission of negligence/liability in a subsequent 
medical malpractice lawsuit, but they also rightly fear that, if other physicians in 
attendance at the M&M criticize the care rendered by the defendant physician, those 
criticisms will be admissible during the medical malpractice case as evidence of the 
defendant physician’s negligence.  An expert hired by the plaintiff and paid to criticize 
the care rendered by the defendant physician is one thing, but how much more 
                                                          
 57 Id.  See also, Dholokia, SAGES MANUAL, supra note 31 at 164 (“The conferences are 
designed to be nonpunitive and focus on the goal of improved patient care . . . [and] should 
facilitate open discussion of medical/surgical error, without . . . fear of punishment.”). 
 58 The Nebraska Supreme Court summarized the protection from disclosure/admissibility 
provided to M&Ms thusly: 
Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these . . .  meetings; and these 
meetings are essential to the continued improvement in the care and treatment of 
patients. Candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua non of 
adequate hospital care. To subject these discussions and deliberations to the discovery 
process, without a showing of exceptional necessity, would result in terminating such 
deliberations. Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere of 
apprehension that one doctor's suggestion will be used as a denunciation of a colleague's 
conduct in a malpractice suit. The purpose of these . . . meetings is the improvement, 
through self-analysis, of the efficiency of medical procedures and techniques. 
Oviatt v. Archbishop of Bergan Mercy Hosp., 214 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Neb. 1974) (quoting 
Bredice, supra note 72).  
 59 See, e.g., Charles M. Key, The Role of PSQIA Privilege in Medical Error Reduction, 21 
HEALTH LAW. 24 (2008) (Physicians “have historically been reluctant to report errors that occur 
in the course of healthcare service delivery, due to fear of liability, the risk of adverse actions 
against them by hospitals medical staffs, licensing boards, and other professional organizations, 
and the potential for injury to their professional reputations”); Paul J. Barringer, J.D., M.P.A. 
and Allen B. Kachalia, M.D., J.D., Error Reporting and Injury Compensation: Advancing 
Patient Safety Through a State Patient Safety Organization, 8 WYO. L. REV. 349, 352 (2008) 
(“fear of punitive sanctions or malpractice liability associated with reporting is likely to reduce 
. . . reporting . . . which in turn can lead to underreporting”); Kelly G. Dunberg, Just What the 
Doctor Ordered?  How the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act May Cure Florida’s 
Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents (Amendment 7), 64 FLA. L. REV. 513, 
518 (2012) (“healthcare providers are less likely to engage in critical analysis of their fellow 
physicians during peer review because of a lack of confidentiality and privilege protections”). 
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persuasive to a jury are the criticisms of the defendant physicians’ friends, colleagues, 
and bosses.  In fact, if admissible, the criticisms of reviewing physicians attending the 
M&M may obviate the typical legal requirement that the plaintiff hire an expert to 
criticize the standard of care rendered by the defendant physician. 
 
C. Immunity, Confidentiality, and Privilege 
 
Previously, each state’s peer review privilege included one or more of the 
following protections: (1) individuals and entities participating in the peer review 
process are immune from liability and thus cannot be sued; (2) information obtained 
and documents reviewed during the peer review process remain confidential; and (3) 
documents generated by, and the conclusions reached during, the peer review process 
are privileged and thus inadmissible in any legal action.60  Typically, physicians are 
unaware there is a legal difference between the terms immunity and confidentiality 
and privilege.  In speaking with doctors, they usually employ the terms 
interchangeably, so it’s understandable that when physicians attempt to reassure each 
other that M&Ms are “confidential” what they really should say—if they want the 
M&M fully protected—is that everything said and done at the M&M is “privileged.”  
Immunity protects someone from being held personally liable; confidentiality requires 
a participant not divulge what she heard, read, or was privy to; privilege protects 
material or statements from admission into evidence.61  
The HCQIA provides immunity from some legal actions.  For example, a 
reviewing physician is immune from a defamation suit when it is based on something 
the reviewing physician allegedly said during peer review.  However, the HCQIA 
confers neither confidentiality nor privilege for the peer review process, and 
specifically provides no protections of any kind in a medical malpractice suit.62 
In states that protect as privileged whatever occurs in, is said during, or is generated 
by the peer review process, legislatures have recognized that disclosure, openness, and 
admissibility produce a chilling effect on both the peer review participants and 
process, which undermines the goals of peer review.  A peer review privilege 
                                                          
 60 Not privileged is any information, material, or evidence created independent of the peer 
review process (i.e., just because a document is reviewed or discussed during the peer review 
process does not necessarily equate to that document becoming privileged).  For example, a 
patient’s medical records—even though presented during an M&M—are not protected by the 
peer review privilege.  See, e.g., Moretti v. Lowe, 592 A.2d 855, 858 (R.I. 1991) (“information 
otherwise available from original sources even if the information was presented at a peer-review 
committee meeting” not protected by the peer review privilege); Gauthreaux v. Frank, 656 
So.2d 634 (La. 1995). 
 61 See, e.g., Susan O. Scheutzow and Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Confidentiality and Privilege of 
Peer Review Information: More Imagined Than Real, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 169, 191 (1993) 
(“Confidentiality and privilege are two compatible, yet distinct, concepts. Privilege addresses a 
person's right not to have another testify as to certain matters as part of a judicial process, while 
confidentiality addresses the obligation to refrain from disclosing information to third parties 
other than as part of legal process.”). 
 62 42 U.S.C. § 11115 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting in any manner 
the rights and remedies afforded patients under any provision of Federal or State law to seek 
redress for any harm or injury suffered as a result of negligent treatment or care by any 
physician, health care practitioner, or health care entity”). 
 
234 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 229:221 
 
protecting M&Ms encourages participants to be bone-scrapingly honest in an effort to 
determine what went wrong and how to prevent it in the future.63  Without the 
privilege, there can be no full, open candor.64 
State privilege laws protecting peer review vary widely, with some states applying 
a broad privilege to protect virtually everything regarding peer review,65 while others 
protect only materials generated by and discussions occurring during the actual peer 
review.66  Most states appear to value more highly the peer review privilege as it 
applies to credentialing/hiring, as opposed to regarding what occurs at M&Ms.67 
        
                                                          
 63 “[T]he direct chilling effect on the institutional or individual self-analyst . . . operates to 
discourage the analyst from investigating thoroughly and frankly or even from investigating at 
all” and that is exactly what the privilege is designed to prevent.  Note, The Privilege of Self-
Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1091-1092 (1983). 
 64 See, e.g., Robin Locke Nagele & Kathy L. Poppitt, Is the Peer Review Privilege in Critical 
Condition? Health Lawyers Organization website, http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/
Programs/Materials/ Documents/AM13 /J_nagele_poppitt.pdf, last accessed October 4, 2014 
(“The threat of litigation can prove a strong deterrent to candid discussion and evaluation of 
peers . . . If information generated during the peer review process can be discovered or 
introduced as evidence at trial, the effectiveness of peer review could be hampered because 
physicians will be reluctant to provide a complete and honest evaluation.”).  One federal district 
court summarized the importance of providing the protection of privilege to M&Ms thusly: 
Given the ‘overwhelming public interest’ in providing physicians with a confidential 
context in which to evaluate the effectiveness of life-saving techniques and procedures, 
the Court is compelled to recognize the self-critical analysis privilege in the context of 
morbidity and mortality conferences will apply in this case . . . Clearly the public 
good—saving lives and correcting life threatening errors by physicians resulting from 
preserving the confidentiality of morbidity and mortality conferences—outweighs the 
general preference for open discovery. 
Weekoty v. U.S., 30 F.Supp.2d 1343, 1347-1348 (D.N.M. 1998). 
 65 Texas physicians, for example, enjoy a fairly expansive privilege: “each proceeding or 
record of a medical peer review committee is confidential, and any communication made to a 
medical peer review committee is privileged . . . [t]he records and proceedings of a medical 
committee are confidential and are not subject to court subpoena.”  Tex. Occ. Code Ann. 
§160.007(a) and Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §161.032(a).  In Massachusetts, a hospital 
“incident report” regarding a psychiatric patient jumping off the hospital roof  was considered 
under the umbrella of peer review and thus privileged.  Carr v. Howard, 689 N.E.2d 1304 (Mass. 
1998).  Illinois courts have interpreted the peer review privilege to include medical journal 
articles read and considered by the peer review committee because the articles would reveal the 
committee’s decision-making process (which the peer review privilege protects).  Anderson v. 
Rush-Copley Med. Ctr., Inc., 894 N.E.2d 827 (Ill. App. 2008). 
 
 66 Melissa Chiang, Promoting Patient Safety: Creating a Workable Reporting System, 18 
YALE J. REG. 383, 388 (2001).  For example, Ohio’s peer review privilege does not extend to 
“unusual occurrence’ reports.  Ward v. Summa Health, 920 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App. 2009).  
Nevada’s peer review privilege does not protect “occurrence” reports.  Columbia/HCA v. 
Eighth Judicial Dist. Nevada, 936 P.2d 844 (Nev. 1997).  
 67 See Nagle, supra note 64. 
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IV. EROSION OF THE PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE 
 
Recognizing the value of peer review (both in credentialing/hiring and in M&Ms) 
as a vital tool in the prevention of medical errors, state legislatures enacted 
confidentiality and privilege protections for peer review to protect it from discovery 
and admissibility in subsequent legal actions,68 chiefly medical malpractice cases;69 in 
the absence of a federal peer review privilege, states supplied the needed protection.  
However, despite state statutes and evidentiary rules designed to protect peer review, 
state courts—and even some state legislatures—continue to weaken the peer review 
privilege.  And, based on Congress intentionally declining to create a peer review 
privilege in the HCQIA, for over two decades federal courts have refused to recognize 
a federal peer review privilege, whether based on common law or other principles.70  
Of course, when adjudicating state medical malpractice claims that also involve a 
federal question, federal courts apply federal procedural rules and therefore decline to 
allow the state’s peer review privilege to protect and exclude from admission into 
evidence statements and materials from an M&M.71 
                                                          
 68 Without adequate legal protection for M&Ms, it was feared that effective peer review 
would simply cease.  See, e.g., Dade County Medical Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 120 (Fla. 
App. 1979): 
Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of [M&M] meetings; and these 
meetings are essential to the continued improvement in the care and treatment of 
patients. Candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua non of 
adequate hospital care. To subject these discussions and deliberations to the discovery 
process, without a showing of exceptional necessity, would result in terminating such 
deliberations. 
 69 See Nagele, Is the Peer Review Privilege, supra note 64 at 2 (“Medical Malpractice and 
related cases in the state courts have been the impetus for most peer review confidentiality and 
privilege protections”). 
 70 Congress “spoke loudly with its silence in not including a privilege against discovery of 
peer review material in the HCQIA.”  Alissa Marie Bassler, Federal Law Should Keep Pace 
with States and Recognize a Medical Peer Review Privilege, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 689, 704 (2003), 
quoting, U.S. v. QHG of Ind., Inc., 1998 WL 1756728 at *7 (N.D. Ind. 1998). 
 71 Thus, plaintiffs are encouraged to create a means to have their state medical malpractice 
case heard in federal court, resulting in subsequent—perhaps collateral—federal governmental 
hospitals or healthcare clinics being added as defendants to invoke liability against the federal 
government and thus create a federal question (via a claim under the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act, Federal Torts Claim Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, or 
perhaps even under the Sherman Act).  Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that “where there are both federal and supplemental state law claims at issue, the 
federal common law of privileges controls as to the entire case”); see also, Schlegel v. Kaiser 
Foundation Health, 2008 WL 4570619 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Rodney H. Lawson et al., 
Credentialing and Peer Review of Health Care Providers: The Process and Protections, AM. 
LAW INST. ABA 7 (2012) (“plaintiffs will sometimes join medical malpractice claims with 
[federal] claims in order to obtain federal question jurisdiction . . . the majority position seems 
to be that state privilege law does not apply in a case with federal question jurisdiction and 
supplemental state claims”); See also Bassler, Federal Law Should Keep Pace, supra note 70 
at 691 (“federal courts in these cases are not applying the [state’s peer review] privilege to either 
the federal claims or the state claims . . . [thus] plaintiffs have an incentive to look for a federal 
question as a device for forcing disclosure in a federal court”). 
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A. Federal Courts 
 
The HCQIA specifically does not create a federal peer review privilege,72 but 
federal courts were faced with the question whether to recognize a new federal peer 
review privilege, as physicians and medical institutions requested courts find an 
implicit privilege within the Act or based on federal common law.73  The HCQIA does 
specifically exclude from the qualified immunity it created to protect reviewing 
physicians in peer review actions any information, documents, or materials sought 
from the peer review process by litigants in a federal civil rights action.74  So, federal 
courts have ruled that in medical malpractice actions physicians cannot look to the 
HCQIA for privilege protection from disclosure, discover, and admissibility anything 
done, said, or generated during morbidity and mortality conferences.75  
Historically, the Supreme Court of the United States has disfavored evidentiary 
privileges76 and has “expressly declined to create a federal common law privilege 
against disclosure” of peer review materials in employment discrimination cases.77  
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the existence of a peer review 
privilege for morbidity and mortality conferences in the context of a medical 
malpractice action,78 the federal circuit courts of appeal have noted that “a medical 
peer review privilege was not among the nine specific privileges recommended by the 
Advisory Committee in its proposed privileges rule”79 and that federal common law 
never adopted a peer review privilege, and thus have ruled no such privilege exists.80  
Based on Supreme Court and circuit court of appeals precedent, nearly all federal 
districts courts have likewise declined to recognize a federal privilege for peer 
review.81 
                                                          
 72 “’Congress spoke loudly with its silence’ in not enacting a broad privilege against 
discovery of peer review materials.”  KD Ex Rel. Dieffenbach, 715 F.S.2d 587, 594-595 (D.Del. 
2010), quoting, in part, Teasdale v. Marin Gen. Hosp., 138 F.R.D. 691, 694 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 73 Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 
 74 See, e.g., Johnson v. Spohn, 334 Fed.Appx. 673, 684 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The HCQIA 
specifically excludes civil rights claims from immunity” under 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)). 
 75 Id.  
 76 See, e.g., U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (evidentiary privileges “are not lightly 
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth”). 
 77 Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990). 
 78 Francis v. U.S., 2011 WL 2224509 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 79 See Allen, supra note 42; see also, Jenkins v. DeKalb Co., 242 F.R.D. 652, 655 (N.D. Ga. 
2007) (the “Supreme Court has never recognized a federal medical peer review privilege and 
there are no circuit court cases recognizing such a privilege”). 
 80 See, e.g., Virmani v. Novant Health, Inc., 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001); Memorial Hosp. 
McHenry Co. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 81 See, e.g., Nilavar v. Mercy Health, 210 F.R.D. 597, 609 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (“the Court 
finds that the federal common law has never adopted a physician peer review privilege, and that 
the great weight of authority . . . militate[s] against doing so in this case”); Leon v. County of 
San Diego, 202 F.R.D. 631 (S.D. Cal. 2001): Krolikowski v. Univ. Mass., 150 F.Supp.2d 246 
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B. State Courts 
Unlike federal courts that decide whether a federal common law privilege for 
medical peer review exists or should be recognized under the facts of a particular case, 
state courts determine privilege based on state statutes regarding peer review.82  As all 
50 states enacted some form of law or evidentiary rule to provide some protection for 
peer review, disparate case law exists in every state regarding a peer review 
privilege.83  Although state courts review the relevant peer review statute or 
evidentiary rule when deciding such cases, in general the courts narrowly interpret the 
privilege and thus order production, disclosure, and admissibility when the evidence 
does not fit squarely within the protections provided by statute.84  Some state courts 
appear to be extending the parameters of what constitutes waiver of the peer review 
privilege, resulting in the physician or hospital losing protection.85  Even in cases 
where there was no intent to waive the peer review privilege, courts have ruled there 
was a waiver and thus have denied privilege.86 
The focus of this essay is the peer review privilege as it applies to M&Ms and the 
goal of medical error reduction and, therefore, state court decisions regarding the 
interpretation of the peer review privilege as it applies to M&Ms are most persuasive.  
A prime example of the manner in which state courts are weakening the peer review 
privilege protecting M&Ms is the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s decision in Sisters of 
Charity Health System v. Raikes.87  There, in three medical malpractice suits 
consolidated for purposes of answering the legal question of the extent of the privilege, 
the court held that Kentucky’s peer review privilege did not protect peer review in 
                                                          
(D.Mass. 2001).  However, a handful of federal districts have recognized a federal peer review 
privilege specific to the facts of that case.  See, e.g., Francis, supra note 78 (“The Court is 
persuaded that a privilege protecting peer review records from disclosure in medical or dental 
malpractice actions would promote the interests of health care practitioners, health care facilities 
and the public, by encouraging self-evaluation and improving the quality of care.”); Veith v. 
Portage County, 2012 WL 4850197 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (“The public interest lies strongly in favor 
of recognizing a privilege for these materials in medical malpractice actions.”). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.  
 84 See, e.g., Pastore v. Samson, 900 A.2d 1067 (R.I. 2006) (court must strictly and narrowly 
construe peer review privilege statute); Claypool v. Mladineo, 724 So.2d 373 (Miss. 1998) (peer 
review privilege statute does not protect all materials and statements from peer review); Ward 
v. Summa Health Sys., 920 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App. 2009) (peer review privilege does not extend 
to unusual medical occurrences); Pietro v. Marriott, 810 N.E.2d 217 (Ill. App. 2004) (peer 
review privilege does not extend to statements of, and documents generated by, nurses at 
assisted living facility); Valley Health v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. Nevada, 252 P.3d 676 (Nev. 
2011); Adams v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 955 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1998); Hosp. Auth. Valdosta v. 
Meeks, 678 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. 2009); DeSantis v. Simon, 209 P.3d 1069 (Colo. 2009); Phelps v. 
Physicians Ins. Co., 698 N.W.2d 643 (Wis. 2005); Fellows v. Moynihan, 285 P.3d 864 (Wash. 
2012); Riverside Hosp. v. Johnson, 636 S.E.2d 416 (Va. 2006). 
 85 See Mulholland, Waiver of the Peer Review Privilege, supra note 29.  
 86 See, e.g., State ex rel. Brooks v. Zakaib, 588 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 2003). 
 87 984 So.2d 464 (Ky. 1998). 
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medical malpractice cases.88  In other words, the exact type of legal action—an 
accusation of negligent medical care resulting in harm or death—physicians fear the 
most and that has the most chilling effect on physician candor during M&Ms, is what 
Kentucky does not protect with its peer review privilege.  In so ruling, instead of 
recognizing that the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few, the court instead 
found that the needs of a few injured plaintiffs in proving a case for damages outweigh 
the need for Kentucky’s medical patients to receive the best care possible while risking 
the smallest chance of suffering a preventable hospital injury or death: apparently, in 
enacting a peer review privilege statute, the Kentucky legislature’s “intent and purpose 
was not to hinder an aggrieved patient’s search for the truth in a medical malpractice 
suit against a negligent physician or hospital.”89 
 
C. State Legislatures 
Although all 50 states at one time created a peer review privilege, some state 
legislatures have since weakened the privilege or reduced the scope of protection.  For 
example, the Ohio legislature revised its peer review statute in 2002, eliminating the 
privilege it originally created and substituting limited immunity instead.90  
Washington’s state legislature subsequently revised its original 1971 and 1986 peer 
review protection statutes, resulting in denial of the privilege when seeking to protect 
peer review materials and statements regarding a hospital’s credentialing of, and 
granting of admitting privileges to, a physician in a case alleging medical negligence 
                                                          
 88 Id.   
 89 Id. at 469.  The Supreme Court of Kentucky subsequently affirmed in two other cases 
that, with regards to M&Ms, Kentucky’s peer review privilege does not apply to medical 
malpractice actions.  McFall v. Peace, Inc., 15 S.W.3d 724 (Ky. 2000); Saleba v. Schrand, 300 
S.W.3d 177 (Ky. 2009).  Other states have similarly ruled.  See, e.g., Winters  v. Lutheran 
Medical Ctr., 539 N.E.2d 715 (Ohio App. 1989) (a “hospital’s surgical department’s morbidity 
and mortality conference records may be discoverable and not privileged from disclosure”); 
Romero v. Cohen, 679 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. App. 1998) (physician’s account of adverse medical 
incident communicated to M&M not protected by peer review privilege); Robinson v. 
Springfield Hosp., 2010 WL 503096 (D. Ver. 2010) (Vermont’s peer review privilege only 
protects statements explaining adverse medical incident when made at a formal M&M, not when 
made to members of M&M in an office setting); Anderson v. Rush-Copley Med. Ctr., Inc., 894 
N.E.2d 827 (Ill. App. 2008) (remedial changes to hospital policies and procedures subsequent 
to M&M investigating cause of adverse medical incident not protected by peer privilege and 
must be disclosed). 
 90 The previous version of Ohio’s peer review statute provided that, “[p]roceedings and 
records of all review committees . . . shall be held in confidence and shall not be subject to 
discovery or introduction in evidence in any civil action against a health care professional . . . 
[and] no person . . . shall be permitted or required to testify in any civil action as to any evidence 
or other matters produced or presented during the [peer review] proceedings,” but the current 
version provides only that,  “[n]o individual who is a member of or works for or on behalf of a 
peer review committee of a health care entity shall be liable in damages to any person for any 
acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct within the scope of the functions of the peer review 
committee.”  Ohio Stat. § 2305.251 (2012).   
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against the physician and hospital.91  The Virginia legislature revised its peer review 
privilege statute to exempt from protection hospital incident reports because, although 
they are utilized in the peer review and/or M&M process, the reports also serve another 
purpose.92 
In one instance, it was not the state legislature but state voters—spurred on by the 
plaintiffs bar—that simply eviscerated the peer review privilege regarding M&Ms.  
Originally, Florida possessed one of the strongest, most comprehensive peer review 
privileges.93  However, in 2004 Florida voters overwhelmingly approved a state 
constitutional amendment called “The Patient’s Right to Know”94 that was presented 
as common sense legislation allowing patients access to any and all records regarding 
adverse medical incidents but in reality was a thinly veiled attempt by medical 
malpractice plaintiffs lawyers to gain access to admissions/inculpatory evidence to 
prove their cases.95  So shocking to physicians, hospitals, defense attorneys, and state 
legislators was this development,96 a four-year court and legislative battle ensued to 
prevent, limit, or delay application; finally, in 2008, the amendment took effect97 and, 
according to Florida physicians, full and effective M&Ms simply ceased.98 
                                                          
 91 See, e.g., Fellows v. Moynihan, 285 P.3d 864, 872 (Wash. 2012) (“We hold that the peer 
review privilege and quality improvement privilege do not apply to records documenting a 
hospital's initial credentialing and privileging of a” physician).  
 92 Va. Code § 8.01-581.17(C) (2014); Riverside Hosp., Inc. v. Johnson, 636 S.E.2d 416 (Va. 
2006). 
 93 Fla. Stat. § 395.0191, § 395.0193, § 395.0197, § 766.1015, § 459.016, § 400.118 (West 
2007).  See also, Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984); Cruger v. Love, 599 So.2d 111 (Fla. 
1992); Brown v. Graham, 2005 WL 900722 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005) (“Florida courts have 
consistently upheld the privileges, even in circumstances beyond the literal reach of the statutory 
language.”). 
 94 Art. X, § 25(a), Fla. Const.  The constitutional amendment is commonly referred to as 
“Amendment 7.”   
 95 See, e.g., James C. Sawran & Robert C. Weill, Amendment 7: Will the Patient's Right to 
Know Come at Too High A Price?, 24 NO. 2 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 7 (2005). 
 96 Melissa Morgan Hawkins, Amendments 7 and 8 Update: Legislation Enabling the 
Patients' Right to Know Act and Three Strike Rule, 25 NO. 2 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 7 (2006). 
 97 Florida Hospital Waterman v. Buster, 984 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2008). 
 98 No physician or hospital administrator would go on the record admitting they are no 
longer conducting candid M&Ms because Florida and federal law continue to require peer 
review activity, but many informed me privately that they simply “go through the motions” 
because they know if they admit medical mistakes during an M&M then their liability in a 
subsequent medical malpractice lawsuit is assured.  See also, Laura V. Yeager, Amendment 7: 
Medical Tradition v. the Will of the People: Has Florida’s Peer Review Privilege Vanished?, 
13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 123, 148 (2009) (“since the passage of Amendment 7 peer review 
[in Florida] has come to a screeching halt”); Sawran, Amendment 7, supra note 95 at 7 (“with 
the loss of confidentiality will come a decrease in the quality of care to patients . . . health care 
providers will now think twice about reporting incidents since they know such information will 
not be protected . . . health care facilities may be unable to identify trends or track results . . . 
the health care industry [now] fears that a lower quality peer review process may decrease the 
quality of physician services”). 
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Thus, no peer review privilege protecting M&Ms exists in federal court, and the 
patchwork of state peer review privileges as a whole does not provide sufficient 
protection for M&Ms.99  Physicians simply will not candidly participate in peer review 
if there are no privilege protections; and the prevalence of medical errors killing 
America’s patients can only be explained by physicians’ refusal to identify, 
investigate, and discuss medical errors due to their fear that such disclosures will be 
used against them in a medical malpractice case.100  Something had to be done, and 
believe it or not Congress did it.  Unfortunately, physicians, hospitals and most 
importantly the courts are not using it. 
 
V. THE PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT 
Immediately after publication of the IOM report detailing the extent of preventable 
hospital deaths caused by medical error, members of Congress began working on bi-
partisan legislation to address the problem.  Specifically, Congress desired to 
incorporate many of the IOM’s recommendations regarding disclosure, investigation, 
and information-sharing of medical errors.101  The result was the PSQIA,102 passed 
unanimously in the Senate and with only three dissenting votes in the House.103  The 
administrative rule implementing the PSQIA became effective in 2009,104 so, 
basically, the PSQIA has been around for over seven years; however, as yet no federal 
or state court has held that a physician’s statements, documents, or materials produced 
during an M&M is privileged under the PSQIA.105  What exactly is the problem? 
 
A. How the PSQIA Should Work 
 
                                                          
 99 Congress believed that “State peer review protections are inadequate to allow the sharing 
of information to promote patient safety.”  S. Rep. No. 109-544, at 3 (2005).  See also, Levy, 
Patient Safety, supra note 9 at 403 (“state protections are not able to promote a wide-scale 
system of disclosure and analysis of medical errors”). 
 100 See IOM, TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 16 at 109-112. 
 101 The IOM report “pinpointed among underlying issues the tendency to place undue focus 
on individual blame, while ignoring the reality of broader systematic failure as a core issue 
affecting patient safety.”  Key, The Role of the PSQIA, supra note 59; Chiang, Promoting Patient 
Safety, supra note 66 at 4. 
 102 The PSQIA was enacted and signed into law in 2005, less than a year after Floridians 
voted to allow unfettered access to M&M records by approving Amendment 7.  Although 
members of Congress began working on the PSQIA years prior to Florida’s Amendment 7 being 
voted in, it certainly does not seem coincidental that the PSQIA—which provides the privilege 
protection for M&Ms that Amendment 7 eviscerated—came so quickly on the heels of 
Amendment 7. 
 103 Final Vote Results for Roll Call 434, at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/roll434.xml (last 
accessed Sept. 30, 2014). 
 104 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 70031, 70732 (Nov. 21, 2008) 
(codified at 42 C.F.R. Part 3). 
 105 See infra note 115. 
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Nowhere in the PSQIA does the term “peer review privilege,” or even the term 
“peer review,” appear.106  Instead, the PSQIA calls for establishing “Patient Safety 
Organizations” (“PSOs”) intended to serve as the umbrella for conducting M&Ms.  
The PSQIA contemplates that a company or group, or a hospital or other medical 
institution, will create a separate PSO entity to which medical error information is 
transmitted.  The goal of the PSO is to collect and analyze medical error information 
so that corrective actions and changes to policies and procedures can be enacted to 
remediated errors.  Local PSOs then provide their error data to the larger Network of 
Patient Safety Databases that analyzes error trends both regionally and nationally and 
recommends strategies to prevent future errors.  Under the PSQIA, the medical error 
information is termed “Patient Safety Work Product” (“PSWP”) and prior to being 
sent to a PSO this PSWP is communicated/transmitted by the involved physicians to 
the individual hospital’s Patient Safety Evaluation System (“PSES”).  In essence, the 
PSES becomes the M&M.  The PSES does many things—generates, collects, archives, 
and maintains PSWP—but also serves as the forum where everything that used to 
occur at an M&M should now take place. 
For example, the Florida Hospital Association and the South Florida Hospital & 
Healthcare Association partnered to create the Patient Safety Organization of Florida 
(“PSOF”).107  If they so choose, Florida hospitals may join the PSOF—or any other 
                                                          
 106 However, Congress’ purpose in creating the PSQIA was clear, according to the House of 
Representatives report: 
The IOM report offered several recommendations to improve patient safety and reduce 
medical error, including that Congress pass legislation to extend peer review protections 
to data related to patient safety and quality improvement that are developed and 
analyzed by health care organizations for internal use or shared with others solely for 
the purpose of improving safety and quality . . . This bill's intended purpose is to 
encourage the reporting and analysis of medical errors and health care systems by 
providing peer review protection of information reported to patient safety organizations 
for the purposes of quality improvement and patient safety. These protections will 
facilitate an environment in which health care providers are able to discuss errors openly 
and learn from them. The protections apply to certain categories of documents and 
communications termed “patient safety work product” that are developed in connection 
with newly created patient safety organizations. This patient safety work product is 
considered privileged and, therefore, cannot be subject to disclosure. 
H.R. Rep. No. 109–197 (2005) (emphasis added).  See also, Dieffenbach, supra note 72 at 595 
(the PSQIA “announces a more general approval of the medical peer review process and more 
sweeping evidentiary protections for materials used therein”).  It is possible Congress 
intentionally declined to employ the term “peer review” in an effort to protect an even broader 
category of information qualifying for privilege than typically encompassed by traditional peer 
review.  See, e.g., Levy, Patient Safety, supra note 9 at 414. 
 107 Patient Safety Organization of Florida website, http://www.psoflorida.org/about.html, 
last accessed September 30, 2014.  It is important to note that the PSQIA commercialized 
M&Ms in a manner not previously seen; traditionally hospitals conducted M&Ms, but the 
PSQIA requires a separate PSO entity be created as a clearinghouse for the hospital’s PSWP 
and PSES analysis (i.e., no privilege protects PSWP or PSES analysis if the hospital does not 
contract with a PSO with the intention of transmitting PSWP to the PSO).  Most PSOs charge 
a per-bed fee to hospitals to serve as the hospital’s PSO, which turns the PSO system into a 
potentially profitable business.  See, e.g., Mark Friedman, “Hospital Safety System Slow to 
Take Off in Arkansas,” Arkansas Business, Sept. 12, 2011, at http://www.arkansas
business.com/print/article/33574 (“The price to use [PSO] American Data Network’s system 
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PSO in Florida—and employ it as their PSO.108  The Mayo Clinic of Jacksonville may 
decide it wants to join the PSOF and does so.  The Mayo Clinic establishes its own 
PSES at its facility.  A medical error occurs at Mayo and the patient dies.  The involved 
physicians meet with other physicians within the context of Mayo’s PSES and discuss 
the error—just as they would at an M&M—and determine the cause of the error.  The 
physicians make full, open, candid statements about the care they rendered and admit 
their mistakes.  The PSWP records and PSES analysis are transmitted to the PSOF.  
The PSOF analyzes the PSWP information, and also sends it on to the Network of 
Patient Safety Database.  From the information, investigation, and analysis provided 
through its PSES, Mayo is able to determine a system failure that led to the errors 
made by the physicians; Mayo implements a new policy to ensure the mistake does 
not occur again.  The PSOF identifies other hospitals that it serves as incurring the 
same medical error that Mayo encountered; the PSOF analyzes the PSWP of all the 
hospitals it serves and makes a recommendation for remedial action at all its 
hospitals.109  The Network of Patient Safety Database analyzes the PSWP and data 
sent from the PSOF and identifies a regional or national trend of the same error May 
encountered; the Network of Patient Safety database makes a regional or national 
recommendation to all the hospitals it serves.  The specific medical error that resulted 
in a death at the Mayo Clinic in Jacksonville, Florida is never repeated again at any 
hospital in the United States.110  This is exactly how Congress envisioned the PSQIA 
working. 
To encourage hospitals and physicians to participate in this system, the PSQIA 
establishes a broad privilege protecting PSWP.  A patient who becomes a medical 
malpractice plaintiff alleging negligent care certainly may discover and admit into 
evidence her own medical records,111 but if the alleged negligent care was discussed 
                                                          
ranges from $25,000 to less than $30,000 for a hospital with about 200 beds.”).  This new 
financial aspect of peer review may be considered one of the drawbacks of the PSQIA, and one 
reason not all hospitals have contracted with a PSO. 
 108 There is no requirement mandating hospitals create or join a PSO. 
 109 The American Medical Association encourages physicians to join a PSO, touting that 
“PSO participation enables physicians to learn from the experiences of others, participate in 
redesigning systems that enhance care delivery, and develop resources and processes needed to 
enhance safer care, mitigate patient harm and increase care efficiency.”  AMA, “The Physician’s 
Guide to Patient Safety Organizations,” 3 (2009).  See also, Gosfield, Patient Safety, supra note 
11 (“Here are five steps physicians should take to protect themselves while also working to 
improve the quality of care they provide . . . 1. Develop a [PSES] . . . 2. Identify and contract 
with a PSO”). 
 110 Although no court has yet ruled on the issue, in all likelihood Florida’s Amendment 7 is 
trumped by the PSQIA—“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law 
. . . patient safety work product shall be privileged,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-22—so even where a 
state’s voters have effectively abolished the peer review privilege, so long as the requirements 
of the PSQIA are met, what under the state scheme is discoverable and admissible nonetheless 
becomes privileged and inadmissible under the PSQIA.  This is the exact opposite effect of what 
plaintiffs lawyers previously accomplished by adding a federal claim to defeat a state’s peer 
review privilege.  See supra note 71.  
 111 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21 (7)(B)(ii) (2010).  The PSQIA also exempts from privilege discharge 
records and medical bills, as these records are maintained for a purpose other than patient safety, 
even though they ultimately may be transmitted through a PSES or to a PSO.  Because patients 
who become medical malpractice plaintiffs may still discover and seek admissibility of original 
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and analyzed within the PSES with the goal of improving future patient care and 
safety, nothing regarding that discussion or analysis is discoverable or admissible, and 
no one in attendance at any PSES meeting (i.e., M&M) may divulge what occurred or 
was said.  As long as the PSWP is collected or created for the purpose of reporting it 
to a PSO or simply “constitute the deliberations or analysis of”112 a PSES, it is 
privileged, confidential, not subject to discovery, and protected from any subpoena.113 
So, the PSQIA provides physicians that level of protection they have long 
sought.114  If their hospital is a member of a PSO and establishes a PSES, physicians 
may conduct candid M&Ms under the blanket of a PSES to properly investigate, 
discuss, analyze, and remediate medical errors, and even fully admit mistakes during 
the M&M without fear the admission will later be used to prove negligence/liability.  
But, seven years after its effective date, the PSQIA system isn’t working—or, isn’t 
working fully yet—at least in the context of published case opinions.  
 
B. Why the PSQIA Hasn’t Worked Yet 
 
If the PSQIA protects M&Ms in a comprehensive way no state peer review 
privilege does, then why is there not at least one reported federal or state case holding 
that PSWP from an M&M (or, to use the PSQIA term, a PSES) is privileged under the 
PSQIA and thus inadmissible against a physician accused of medical negligence?  
Dozens of reported cases involve the question whether the PSQIA operates to protect 
                                                          
medical records to prove their claim, the PSQIA does not “alter any existing rights or remedies 
available to injured patients.”  151 Cong. Rec. S8744, 555 (2005). 
 112 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21 (7)(A)(ii) (2006).  It is vital to note that PSWP need not actually be 
transmitted to a PSO for privilege to attach. See, 73 Fed. Reg. 70741; however, some courts 
have erroneously held that PSWP was not privileged because it was not transmitted to a PSO.  
See, e.g., Lee Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 535 (Tenn. 2010) (stating that the 
“PSQIA creates a tightly crafted federal privilege for ‘patient safety work product’ actually 
reported to a” PSO). 
 113 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22 (a)(2).  The PSQIA also addresses the issue of waiver of the privilege 
(see supra Part III Sec. B); under the PSQIA, sharing of PSWP with PSOs does not result in 
waiver.  Similarly, under the PSQIA, state medical malpractice plaintiffs no longer need simply 
file a federal claim to pierce any state peer review privilege.  However, there are a handful of 
limitations on the privilege.  For example, in criminal proceedings PSWP may be disclosed if it 
contains evidence of a criminal act and such information cannot be reasonably obtained through 
other means.  Id. § 299b-22 (c)(2)(G).  
 114 Levy, Patient Safety, supra note 9 at 408 (“Congress created this system so that safety 
information could be processed without fear of discovery.”).  The PSQIA also provides another 
protection for physicians: if a physician alleges her employer retaliated against her because she 
revealed a medical error, the physician may successfully request PSWP be disclosed to prove 
her case of retaliation.  42 U.S.C. § 299b-22 (c)(1)(B) (2010).  Clearly, Congress desired to do 
all it could to ensure medical errors are reported.  Additionally, the PSQIA may provide a higher 
level of protection in peer review credentialing/hiring actions than the HCQIA does.  The 
HCQIA merely grants qualified immunity for the peer review process; although the PSQIA does 
not specifically address credentialing/hiring, it does define “patient safety activities” to include 
“the utilization of qualified staff,” which could be read as encompassing credentialing/hiring if 
PSWP regarding such is created and transmitted to a PSO.  Levy, Patient Safety, supra note 9 
at 413. 
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as privileged certain peer review documents or statements, but not one court has ruled 
that—in the case of a medical malpractice action against a physician or hospital—it 
does.115 
Some of this can be explained by the supposition that, although the effective date 
of the PSQIA was 2009, it took hospitals and medical institutions time to set up a 
PSES, create or join a PSO, incur a medical error involving harm or death, conduct an 
M&M regarding that medical error, have the patient commence a medical malpractice 
action and request documents or information from the M&M, and then for a court to 
hear and decide upon the legal question resulting in a published decision.  However, 
courts have ruled against the PSQIA privilege in cases,116 so, obviously there has been 
sufficient time for cases to progress to the stage where a decision has been reported 
and published. 
The most glaring decision denying the PSQIA privilege came from the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky on August 21, 2014.  In Tibbs v. Bunnell,117 the 4-2 majority held 
that, in a medical malpractice action against a physician and hospital, the PSQIA did 
not protect as privileged a PSES record regarding plaintiff’s surgical death that was 
transmitted to the hospital’s PSO.118  The plaintiff’s interrogatory at issue posed 
“whether any investigation, including but not limited to peer review and/or incident 
reports, has been conducted upon the medical treatment, surgery or care rendered to 
the Plaintiff,” and the plaintiff’s request for production asked for “any and all 
documents generated by any investigation, including but not limited to peer review 
and/or incident reports of the events.”119  The lengthy dissent explained that this 
information and material was exactly what the PSQIA was enacted to protect,120 but 
the majority concluded that the PSQIA created a narrow privilege and that, because 
Kentucky law mandated that hospitals establish and maintain administrative reports—
                                                          
 115 One state appellate court held that, in a case where a state agency sought records from a 
pharmacy regarding possible medication errors by three of its pharmacists, the PSQIA protected 
as privileged medication error reports made to an internal reporting system that were then 
transmitted to the pharmacy’s PSO.  Dept. Financial & Professional Reg. v. Walgreen, Co., 970 
N.E.2d 552 (Ill. App. 2012).  As yet, this is the only reported case wherein a court has upheld 
the privilege created in the PSQIA. 
 116 See, e.g., Venosh v. Henzes, 2013 WL 3725157 at *12 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2013) (materials not 
privileged under PSQIA because not reported to PSO); Schlegel v. Kaiser Foundation Health 
Plan, 2008 WL 4570619 at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (the PSQIA does not create a broad federal 
peer review privilege but rather “carves out a narrow peer review privilege”); Gulley v. 
LaPaglia, 2014 WL 223646 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (declining to rule the PSQIA privilege protects 
the requested information and documents); Francis, supra note 78 at *6 (“The quality assurance 
review documents at issue in this [FTCA] action are not protected under the PSQIA, since they 
were not provided to a PSO.”); Lee Memorial Health Sys. v. Guillermo, 2011 WL 5826672 
(M.D. Fla. 2011) (declining to take jurisdiction and decide whether the PSQIA privilege pre-
empts Florida’s Amendment 7 requiring M&M disclosure); Lee Memorial Health Sys. v. 
Ranieri, 2012 WL 1565366 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (declining to take jurisdiction and decide whether 
the PSQIA privilege pre-empts Florida’s Amendment 7 requiring M&M disclosure).  
 117 Tibbs v. Bunnell, 2014 WL 4115912 (Ky. 2014). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at *1. 
 120 Id. at *11-16. 
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including incident reports—the PSES investigation (i.e., M&M) of the surgical death 
and resulting report were not privileged under the PSQIA.121  Under this logic, because 
Kentucky law requires collection and maintenance of most of the records and reports 
the PSQIA seeks to protect, the PSQIA effectively protects very little PSWP in 
Kentucky, subverting the goal of the PSQIA. 
So, the courts are not helping, not employing the PSQIA privilege to protect M&M 
statements, information, and documents.  But physicians and hospitals are not doing 
all they can to avail themselves of the PSQIA privilege.  Currently, there are only 81 
PSOs in the entire country, located in 30 states; there are only two PSOs west of 
Texas.122  Nearly 50 companies that originally filed applications for PSO approval 
have since abandoned their PSO listing.123  As no federal law requires hospitals 
contract with a PSO, many simply do not.124 
Perhaps there are scores of PSQIA cases working their way through the courts; or, 
medical malpractice plaintiffs lawyers simply are no longer requesting statements, 
information, and documents from M&Ms because they know the hospital has a PSES 
and is a member of a PSO . . . but I doubt it.  Likely, no court desires to take the plunge 
and be the first in the nation to hold that the PSQIA protects M&M materials and 
statements in a medical malpractice case against a physician or hospital.  I hope, 
however, that by the time this essay is published, some court has so ruled. 
  
C. How to Reduce Injuries and Deaths 
 
The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.  When faced with the 
question whether to rule that the PSQIA privilege protects M&M materials and 
statements from disclosure and admissibility, a court must hold that it does.  The 
PSQIA privilege—what traditionally was termed the peer review privilege—should 
be valued at least as much as, say, the spousal communications privilege.  If the 
Supreme Court has found that the spousal communications privilege is to be “regarded 
as so essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the 
disadvantages to the administration of justice,”125 then shouldn’t saving lives by 
reducing preventable hospital deaths similarly outweigh the disadvantage of depriving 
medical malpractice plaintiffs of one—or a few—items of additional evidence to 
prove their cases? 
                                                          
 121 Id. at *6.  The court cited as authority its previous decision in Saleba, supra note 89 
(Kentucky’s peer review privilege does not extend to medical malpractice cases), which pre-
dates the effective date of the PSQIA.  The Tibbs majority relied on the exception to privilege 
in the PSQIA for “a provider’s recording-keeping obligation” under State law.  42 U.S.C. § 
299b-21 (7)(B)(iii)(III) (2006). 
 122 Some have no clients, and simply have been approved by the DHHS to serve as a PSO.   
 123 Alan G Williams, Congress Saved Peer Review: Who Knew?, 149 JAMA Surgery 317, 
318 (2012).    
 124 However, if a healthcare insurance company wants to have its products/services included 
in the state or federal healthcare insurance exchanges under the Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
111-148 (2010), its products/services may only be used at/with hospitals that have a contract 
with a PSO. 
 125 Wolfle v. U.S., 54 S. Ct. 279 (1934).  
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Courts must interpret the PSQIA as Congress intended and find a broad privilege 
protecting statements physicians make and materials hospitals create that further the 
goal of improving patient safety.  Instead of employing the majority’s approach in 
Kentucky’s Tibbs case, courts must consider the privilege as the dissent did, with the 
goal of protecting M&M statements and materials, if possible, because doing so results 
in lives saved and injuries averted.  Odds are, medical malpractice plaintiffs seeking 
to discover M&M statements and materials would far prefer that the same alleged 
error they argue harmed/killed them was corrected prior to their hospital stay; the best 
way to do that is to protect M&Ms with the privilege the PSQIA provides. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The medical community has long known that the peer review process—
specifically M&Ms—works best to improve patient care and reduce preventable 
injuries and death.126  The legal community began assisting the medical community in 
their efforts when the law began recognizing a peer review privilege.  Because federal 
courts declined to provide privilege protections for M&Ms, state courts did not 
adequately protect M&Ms via privilege, and state legislatures did not explicitly step 
in to correct holes in state privileges, Congress created the ultimate remedy for the 
problem when it enacted the PSQIA.  The PSQIA privilege is the best available tool 
to provide physicians the protection they need to embark on their quest to reduce 
preventable medical errors. 
Now that Congress has done its job, state and federal courts must do their jobs and 
boldly uphold the peer review privilege established in the PSQIA when the facts allow 
for a legal interpretation that the privilege may apply. And the medical community 
must do its job by: (1) creating more than 81 PSOs in 30 states; (2) ensuring every 
hospital contracts with a PSO; and, (3) fully utilizing M&Ms for candid investigation, 
discussion, analysis, and remediation of medical errors.  If the courts and the medical 
community now do their jobs, medical errors will decrease: every year, tens of 
thousands of injuries will be prevented, tens of thousands of lives will be saved. 
 
 
                                                          
 126 Abraham Lichtmacher,Quality Assessment Tools: ACOG Voluntary Review of Quality of 
Care Program, Peer Review Reporting System, 35 Obstet Gynecol Clin North Am. 147, 147-
62 (2008).   
